Social Fabric of a Collaborative Colonialism
A Victorian saying went like this: by acquiring Hong Kong, Great Britain had cut a notch in the body of China as a woodsman cuts a notch in a great oak he is presently going to fell. As a "notch," Hong Kong, seized by the British navy in the First Opium War (1840-1842), has possessed a value that can never be measured in terms of territorial conquest. The British sought a place where they could establish an independent commercial and military base free from the bureaucratic Qing government and the Cohong system that restricted foreign trade to be conducted in Canton only. Hong Kong was chosen for its offshore location despite it being only a sparsely populated, geographically barren island. The goal of the British imperialists was to establish their own judicial system with which to govern the activities of their merchants, under the military protection of the British navy (Endacott 1964a, b, c; Norton-Kyshe 1971) . It was out of these concerns that Britain was determined not to make Hong Kong just another Macau, the tiny peninsula that the Portuguese officially governed but which the Chinese government kept running as their own. In contrast, the British exercised truly colonial control over Hong Kong, which stood as a model for subsequent treaty ports.
The West's defeat of China in the First Opium War dealt a heavy blow to the pride of the Qing Empire and to the Chinese gentry; the surging nationalist movements thereafter all considered the war a historic humiliation for China and insisted on claiming that the annexation was forced upon the Chinese by what they saw as an unequal treaty. There is no doubt that Britain accrued enormous benefits from its possession of this tiny treaty port; however, for more than a century after its cession as a war indemnity (at least until the 1980s), successive Chinese governments were equally reluctant to make the reclamation of Hong Kong a national priority. Therefore, although Chinese nationalist rhetoric always complained about "the loss of Hong Kong", the Chinese had an important stake in Hong Kong too.
However, Chinese interests in Hong Kong have never been adequately theorized in the present dominant paradigm of Hong Kong studies, which seldom goes beyond describing the place's peculiarity. Works of this trend always begin with the authors' professed fascination with Hong Kong, a fascination that smacks of a certain exoticism and that usually concerns Hong Kong's uninterrupted prosperity and protracted political stability; then, the political analyses will discuss the geo-strategic expediency of the place; the sociologists will rant about Chinese political apathy; the economists will make a big fuss about Hong Kong's "nearly-perfect" market (e.g. Lau, S.K. 1982; King 1972; Rabushka 1979) . These studies invariably assume Hong Kong to be a unique entity and try to unlock its presumed mystery. They share among themselves a tendency to abstract Hong Kong from its historical and spatial contexts, in particular its colonial milieu. They either treat Hong Kong colonial rule as an exception or turn colonialism into an entirely positive factor, if they do not totally neglect its presence. All in all, they propose a paradigm of Hong Kong exceptionalism and thus try to get around the serious theoretical challenges that require rigorous scholars to give Hong Kong colonialism its due regard. By treating the Hong Kong colonial government as exceptionally benign, or Hong Kong's markets as exceptionally perfect, or Hong Kong Chinese as exceptionally acquiescent, these researchers have seldom probed into Hong Kong colonialism as colonialism. In short, these researchers treat Hong Kong colonialism as a mere historical contingency. Consequently, Ackbar Abbas's (1997) characterization of Hong Kong culture as one of "reverse hallucination" -in the sense that onlookers are "not seeing what is there" -proves to be highly perceptive. Most of these scholarly works examine the colony while attempting to explain away Hong Kong's colonialism.
The cost of such intellectual expediency is dire, I must say. In concrete terms, the exceptionalist paradigm always misses opportunities not only to take up Hong Kong particularities as contradictions inherent in its colonial rule, but also to take those alleged anomalies as epistemological challenges to the respective paradigms of the concerned disciplines. For example, few researchers therein would make use of Hong Kong as a vantage point from which they would examine either the theoretical and the empirical problems of colonial studies or, in terms of the whole Asian political economy, the hegemonic consensus between the colonizer and the colonized. Nor have these researchers thoroughly discussed the influences of this particular colonial formation on China and on Chinese nationalism.
However, recent exceptions to this trend are evident in the contributions made by scholars such as John Carroll (2005 ), Christopher Munn (2001 ), Hui Po-keung (1999 , and Stephanie Po-yin Chung (1998), each of who follows a unique path toward a revision of the Hong Kong studies paradigm. Some of these scholars raise attention to collaboration, a dimension relatively neglected in the aforementioned Hong Kong studies; for example, John Carroll (2005) highlights the collaboration between the British colonists and the Chinese elite, accounting therein for the rise of Hong Kong's Chinese elite into a full-fledged bourgeoisie by the late nineteenth ce ntury; Christopher Munn (2001) also takes advantage of the angle of collaboration but stresses the coercive ways of colonial governance in the first three decades after cession. These scholars present and explore new materials and analytical concepts to redirect approaches to Hong Kong studies. Indeed, any interested scholars can mobilize new resources from the research that has been emerging since the late seventies, when studies began to draw attention to the historical emergence of an Asian regional economy. For example, migration studies have revealed the great significance of Southeast Asia's rapidly developing coastal cities for the formation of a regional trading network that long pre-dated the Europeans' arrival (Chang, P. 1991; Reid 1996; Mackie 1989; Brown 1994; Wang, G. 1981 Wang, G. , 1991 . These studies shed light on the development of Hong Kong and, it is reasonable to argue, open up new perspectives for the study of contemporary China (Steinberg 1987; Tate 1979) . Glimpses of these new pictures will enable us to see that, before European expansion into the region, Chinese merchants (particularly those from the southern provinces like Amoy and Swatow) indeed occupied dominant economic positions. They actively participated in both tribute and private trade between China, Java, Siam, Malacca, and the Ryukyuan Kingdom. As sojourning merchants or settlers, they established close commercial relationships among these port cities and controlled the vast trade networks of South China, Hong Kong, and Southeast Asia. Long before the Opium Wars, many coastal Chinese were already in close contact with Europeans as a result of the latter's trading in commodities such as tea, porcelain, silk, and foodstuffs (e.g. Jansen 1992; Carroll 1997 Carroll , 1999 Hui 1999) . With commercial activities manifest in the coastal Chinese regional networks, in Southeast Asian economies, and in the Europeandominated New World, a class of elite transnationals arose around Hong Kong and exercised considerable economic clout (Mackie 1989; Wang, G. 1981a Wang, G. , b, 1991 Uchida 1959) .
Colonialism as Configured by the Local and the Regional
The rise of European power in the Southeast Asian region went hand in hand with the Europeans' collaboration with the Chinese. The militarily stronger Europeans, who arrived in full force only in the late nineteenth century, soon realized the importance of encouraging the regional trade that was firmly controlled by the Chinese. The Europeans had to rely on the Chinese business networks to expand economically and politically into the region, particularly as the European powers tended to destroy indigenous trading communities in the region (Hao 1970; Brown 1994; Reid 1990) . According to Hui Po-keung's account, the advantage of the Chinese over the latecomer Europeans lay in the former group's ability to speak local languages as well as their familiarity with domestic customs and business practices. According to Hui, the Europeans chose Chinese merchants as collaborators because
The overseas Chinese … were "lost children" of their imperial court and a marginal trading minority in Southeast Asia. Not only did they present no serious political or military threat, but also the colonial powers saw in them a means to deflect anger that might otherwise be directed against the colonial power, and to control anti-colonial movements centered in conquered peoples. While the loss of independence for indigenous states meant that indigenous traders lost military and political support for their trading activities, as well as access to key trading commodities such as pepper and weapons for long distance trade, the Chinese, by contrast, were regarded as suitable partners. (Hui 1999: 32) The overall effect of nineteenth-century European colonial expansion on this region was the inclusion of Chinese merchants in the newly arisen global networks; yet the dependence of the Europeans on the Chinese also helped boost the ability of some Chinese merchants to dominate intra-Asian trade, including trade with China's hinterlands. The role of these Chinese collaborators became even more prominent as late-Qing imperial policy monopolized Chinese trade and restricted Chinese merchants' trade with Europeans to a few coastal ports. Without the help of the Chinese collaborators, the Europeans would hardly have been able to reach China's vast inland market. Among all the European competitors, the British distinguished themselves owing to their more effective and successful use of Chinese networks (Carroll 1997 (Carroll , 1999 . Robinson (1972) considers the Chinese-European collaborations as only part of a wider process that inaugurated an "external or informal stage of industrial imperialism," in which "Ottoman rayahs, Levantine traders, Chinese Mandarins, Indian Brahmins and African chiefs" were gradually turned into Europeanized collaborators by "free trade and Christianity" (Robinson 1972: 126-130) . He focuses on the collaborative systems between Europeans and nonEuropeans in order to uncover the "non-European foundations of European imperialism," which prepared for a distinct stage of Europe's expansion. In short, identifying the existence of collaborative colonial formation can have a significant theoretical effect on our understanding of the global history of imperialism and colonialism.
My purpose here is, however, much more self-consciously limited, for it concerns the features of the distinct regional and local power formation that resulted from collaboration in Hong Kong. Such a local perspective is important for Hong Kong studies because it will help put in place a series of new questions seldom raised. Crucial among them are questions concerning the usual images that Chinese nationalist historiographers present and that portray Chinese as occupying a subordinate position in the face of Western superiority. One adverse consequence of this victim narrative is its flip side: chauvinism. For example, China subsumes Hong Kong under the conventional East-West paradigm, from which the conventional modern Chinese nationalist historiographical tradition derives. Consequently, whatever happens to Hong Kong becomes simply a sideshow compared with China's national-revival struggles. Such a Chinacentered narrative would affirm Hong Kong only as the margin and China only as the center and would, by neglecting the complex regional historical dynamics, perpetuate both the narrow political definition of colonialism and the barren focus on Hong Kong exceptionalism.
At any rate, the regional perspective can help to make a better sense of one crucial irony that Stephanie Po-yin Chung has succinctly described: "As a British colony, Hong Kong ironically had been "colonized" by settlers from South China" (Chung 1998: 21) . The irony has to be understood in at least two senses: first, it was the colonization of Hong Kong that made possible the large-scale settlement of Chinese in Hong Kong; second, some Chinese were indeed active upholders of the British colonial enterprise. Yet, the fact that some Chinese benefited from British expansion might not be that surprising if we take a regional perspective to consider the long record of collaboration between Chinese and British powers all over Southeast Asia. The British conquest of native places, accompanied by a huge influx of Chinese settlers, had indeed become the normal pattern throughout the eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth century.
Opium and Coolie; Building and Contracting
During the massive rise in Britain's opium sales to China, most Chinese merchants who joined the British in commercial affairs did so as opium traders (Beattie 1969; Trocki 1990 Trocki , 1999 Brook and Wakabayashi 2000) . During the war with China, the collaboration of Chinese merchants with the British ranged from supplying the British navy to spying for pro-British military purposes.
These collaborators played an important role in the Opium Wars -so much so that Captain Charles Elliot, the British superintendent of trade, argued that the British crown had an obligation to retain Hong Kong "as an act of justice and protection to the native population upon whom we have been so long dependent for assistance and supply" (CO 129/1, Elliot to Auckland, June 21, 1841, quoted in Carroll 1999).
Apart from trading in opium, overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia actively supplied the British with labor for projects such as housing construction. According to Carroll, it was Chinese contractors, builders, and laborers who usually undertook, at that time, the major construction works in the European colonies. Right after the cession of Hong Kong, quite a number of Chinese flocked there to help the British literally build the new colony (Carroll 1999 , 2005 see also Smith 1985: 114-116) . Although some British officials still perceived Hong Kong as a barren rock several years after the cession, Hong Kong experienced, with the help of the Chinese, a historic building boom during its first decade. Not only did the Chinese of the Canton region flock to Hong Kong to build a colony for the British, but some even returned from other Southeast Asian European colonies to help with the British colony's coastal projects. After all, the returning migrants considered the coast their home country and earned their fortunes in Hong Kong as property speculators. According to Hui, this fast and highly opportunistic influx of Chinese labor and capital into Hong Kong was just one case among many that constituted the common pattern of overseas Chinese merchants' movement into and out of China. These migrant Chinese merchants established residences in all of Southeast Asia's important port cities and moved wherever European expansion led them (Hui 1999: 31) . The few thousand original inhabitants of Hong Kong, who were scattered in a few villages on the island, might well have attached the label "intruders" to these droves of Chinese coming from elsewhere to help the British. Thus Lethbridge writes, "A new settlement of overseas Chinese had been created, which in many respects had more in common with any Chinese community in Southeast Asia than with imperial China itself" (Lethbridge 1978) .
While collaboration between the Chinese and the British was driven by profit, for some overseas Chinese settlers, the prospect of material gain did not adequately explain their enthusiasm. These other settlers hoped to use the British occupation to reverse their fate as socially marginalized persons. For example, prominent among these collaborators were Loo Aqui and Kwok Acheong, well-known Chinese opium smugglers, and Tam Achoy, a contractor who came from Singapore, to where he had earlier migrated illegally. Loo and Kwok were both Tanka (boat people), a group that had long been outcast by the inland Han Chinese (Smith 1985) . For more than a thousand years, the Tanka had been treated as uncivilized people or sea pirates and had been discriminated against by the landed people (Ward 1954; Kani 1967; Hayes 1977; Hung 1997) . Denied the same rights as landed people, they were prohibited from taking the civil service examination (ke ju), owning landed property and marrying inland inhabitants. As a floating population who were not self-sufficient, Tanka had to trade with landed Han people and to participate in all sort of legal and illegal trading and smuggling activities at sea. Together with other overseas Chinese merchants, they formed the backbone of the Chinese who collaborated with the British to colonize Hong Kong. Collaboration with the Westerners brought to them not only economic gain but also advancement in political and social status. In return for their help, the British granted them land, and they were able to speculate on property and became rich (Carroll 1999) . To reverse their fate of political exclusion, some of those successful under the British rule assumed the function of leaders of the local gentry, equivalent to traditional literati. The difference, as I will later show, was only that, under British rule, they did not have to take the civil service examination and earn imperial degrees in order to acquire the status of Chinese gentry.
In the very first decades of this relationship, both Europeans and Chinese got rich through land speculation or opium trade, although it was not the British government's original intention to make Hong Kong a new colony whose chief function would be to accommodate the infamous business. Government ministers in London tried to control, through legislated prohibitions or heavy duties, the export of opium from the island -at least until legal trade in opium was agreed to by the Qing government. Commonly bandied about by promoters of the Opium Wars and the new colony was the claim that, with the opening of a more general commerce with China, British merchants would quickly see their dependence on opium shift to a healthier preoccupation with developing British manufactures. However, for much of the remainder of the century, the shipment of opium to China continued to be a vital part of the colony's economy (Trocki 1990 (Trocki , 1999 see also Brook and Wakabayashi 2000; Miners 1983) . It is estimated that three-quarters of the entire Indian opium crop was passing through Hong Kong by the late 1840s (Munn 2000: 107); and Davis, the second governor of Hong Kong (1844-1848), reported soon after his arrival that almost every person possessed of capital who was not connected with government employment was employed in the opium trade. Munn describes the relationship between opium and Hong Kong as follows:
The opium trade and Hong Kong are so obviously intertwined that it is hardly possible to consider the early history of the colony without some reference to the drug: the colony was founded because of opium; it survived its difficult early years because of opium; its principal merchants grew rich on opium; and its government subsisted on the high land rent and other revenue made possible by the opium trade. Early Chinese traders came to the colony to deal in opium; the drug became standard currency for remittances from Chinese living in Hong Kong to their native places on the mainland; pirated or disputed consignments of opium dominated many judicial proceedings; and opium balls cluttered the colony's numerous pawnbrokers' shops. (Munn 2000: 107) In fact, the continued growth of the opium trade in the 1840s actually held back the development of regular trade between England and China. Some people thought that the cession of Hong Kong would additionally benefit the British there by attracting trade previously carried out under Canton's monopoly; however, the opening of several treaty ports at the same time along the China coast, ironically, rendered the new colony a less than ideal place for regular legal trade. Except as an opium depot or as a military base for the widely predicted second Sino-British war (1858-1860), Hong Kong had little to offer. If not for its role as a safe warehouse for the goods coming in from the illicit opium stations scattered along the coast, the British would have abandoned the colony before the end of the 1840s. The "poppy lords" did not allow any such abandonment to happen, as they always assumed that Hong Kong would be dedicated to the opium trade and had invested heavily in land and in buildings (Munn 2000: 107-8) . The boom of the 1850s helped confirm Hong Kong's status as the chief base for opium smuggling into China. By 1880, about 45 percent of opium flowing into China was smuggled through Hong Kong. This incarnation of the opium business lingered on for the rest of the nineteenth century and only ended in 1909 (Munn 1999). What really pushed Hong Kong away from its status of being just an opium depot was the island's reception of the second wave of Chinese immigrants driven by economic crises and wars. The so-called free trade that the West imposed on China led to the opening of treaty ports such as Shanghai, Ningpo, Foochow, and Amoy, and its influence was deeply felt in southern China; Guangzhou (Canton) became the hardest-hit place (Hao 1986: 14-33; Tsai 1993:21; Ng 1983) . The better-armed, swifter foreign vessels that entered the Chinese coastal trade drove many Cantonese junks out of business, and industrial products imported from foreign countries caused serious economic strain and dislocation among local handicraft industries (Feuerwerker 1969) . Adding to the economic hardship was the Taiping Rebellion, which started in 1850 in neighboring Guangxi and rapidly spread to Guangdong and other southern provinces. The turmoil, which lasted for almost two decades, triggered an exodus of Cantonese; they fled the disorder on the Mainland for the relative order and security of Hong Kong. A large surplus of labor was then available in the coastal regions; many of these potential laborers tried to immigrate to Southeast Asia, sometimes to join secret societies, bandit gangs, or pirate groups (Tsai 1993) . The enormous pressure to emigrate from China created for Hong Kong not only a massive influx of population but also an opportunity to thrive on another business: coolie trade (Campbell 1923; Arensmeyer 1979; Sinn 1995; Yen 1985) . James Legge (of the London Missionary Society) described the 1850s as the "turning point in the progress of Hong Kong" (Legge 1971). Between 1855 and 1900, almost 1.8 million Chinese emigrants embarked at the port of Hong Kong (Sinn 1995; Coolidge 1909; see also Tsai 1993) . The high tide of colonial expansion in this period created a huge demand for contract laborers who would work on the large-scale rubber plantations and in the tin mines in Southeast Asia, on the construction of railroads in North America, and in the gold mines of North America and Australia. The Hong Kong economic base then broadened through the derived demand for transportation, shipbuilding and ship repairing; coolies' remittances to their families in China also boosted Hong Kong's financial sectors (Mei 1979; Tsai 1993: 26; Yen 1985) . As a result, coolie trade, after the opium trade, became another mainstay of the early colonial Hong Kong economy.
Segregated Rule and the Formation of the Chinese Community
The official colonist rhetoric harped on the idea that Hong Kong should be "the great emporium of the China trade"; Governor John Bowring (1854-1859) vowed to make Hong Kong "a model of British good government." Imagined by the colonists to be an Anglo-China, Hong Kong was supposed to play the role of "a living exhibition of European civilization, a meeting point between east and west, where the manners, institutions and technologies of both cultures would engage each other in a productive and beneficial way" (Munn, 2001: 2) . However, the chaotic situations that arose during the colony's first decade rendered the above political and cultural visions no more than empty words or colonialist clichés. One important factor that underlay the lack of a stable colonial project concerns Britain's and the Qing government's disagreement over the colony's political status, particularly with regard to whether Qing officials in Hong Kong could exercise their power to the extent that Qing officials in Macau did (Ting 1989) . The Qing government explored every means by which it could maintain its power over the Chinese population, and in the case of Hong Kong, such maintenance would symbolize the Qing Emperor's sovereignty rights over the island. However, the British Colonial Office was firm in marking Hong Kong off from the Macau model, insisting on the Office's claim to indivisible sovereignty under which the British colonial government could exercise full administrative and judicial powers. Rounds of diplomatic tussles before and after the signing of the Treaty of Nanking (1842) left many controversial issues unresolved so that they sprang up time and again for more than a century. Yet all the British colonial governments generally maintained what Captain Elliot had proclaimed on February 2, 1841:
The natives of the island of Hong Kong and all natives of China thereto resorting, shall be governed according to the laws and customs of China; all British subjects and foreigners residing in, or resorting to, the island of Hong Kong, shall enjoy full security and protection, according to the principles and practice of British law.
(Norton-Kyshe 1971: 4-6)
However, Elliot's principle lacked operational details. During the first few years that the Treaty of Nanking awaited rectification by the British parliament, and while details had to be negotiated with the Chinese Government, Elliot's principle was a matter of fierce debate among different quarters on the British side. Many people questioned the viability and the practicality of such an approach, which placed Hong Kong people into different categories. Some suggested that the official treatment of permanent Chinese residents should differ from the official treatment of temporary Chinese residents; others proposed that, if the Qing's administrative or judicial power were to remain in place, as the Qing government had been insisting, Hong Kong should allow Chinese residents to choose whether to be a Chinese subject or a British subject; still others considered whether it was possible, in Hong Kong, to have Chinese magistrates who would handle jurisdictional matters concerning Chinese (Endacott 1964b: 27-35; Munn 1999: 47) . In 1844, Governor John Davis showed his determination to exert British sovereign rights over Hong Kong by refusing the attempts of Qing officials to intervene into certain criminal cases involving Chinese residents within Hong Kong. Yet he also tried to realize the indirect-rule principle by framing an ordinance whose scheme, modeled after traditional Chinese local policing, would have created unpaid and elected local Chinese "peace officers," (Paouchong and Paouken) to assist police in maintaining peace and order (Endacott 1964a: 57) . Davis' successor, Samuel Bonham (1848 -1854 , in 1853 suggested setting up some kind of limited local Chinese self-government system by hiring paid peace officers (tepos) to settle civil disputes among the Chinese (Endacott 1964a: 84-85) . Nevertheless, all these schemes for an institutional mechanism in which local Chinese could build up a certain degree of self-rule eventually failed. Munn observes that the British colonists in the early decades failed to establish stable and serviceable political links with any leadership of the Chinese community comparable to what the British had practiced in Singapore (Munn 2001: 2). As a result, the colonial government generally left the Chinese community much to itself, although historians are wrong to generalize that period as paradigmatic of British indirect rule in Hong Kong. Munn argues that an overemphasis on the autonomy of the Chinese community masks the fact that the British officials were quite unable to govern the unruly Chinese community and, therefore, always resorted to direct and top-heavy governments through political and legal measures. A strong indicator of that coercive direct rule over Chinese natives was indeed the maintenance by the early colonial regime of one of the largest police forces in the British Empire.
The indirect-rule principle was not easily applicable in Hong Kong, as it was in other British colonies. In 1844, the Colonial Treasurer expressed his uneasiness about the dearth of "respectable" Chinese leaders in Hong Kong and attributed this dearth to the policy of the hostile Chinese Government. He wrote, It is literally true that after three years and a half's uninterrupted settlement there is not one respectable Chinese inhabitant on the island …The policy of the Mandarins on the adjacent coast being to prevent all respectable Chinese from settling at Hong Kong; and in consequence of the hold they possess on their families and relatives this can be done most effectually. At the same time, I believe that they encourage and promote the deportation of every thief, pirate, and idle or worthless vagabond from the mainland to Hong Kong…. No Chinese of humbler class will ever bring their wives and children to the colony. The shopkeepers do not remain more than a few months on the island, when another set takes their place; there is, in fact, a continual shifting of a Bedouin sort of population, whose migratory, predatory, gambling, and dissolute habits utterly unfit them for continuous industry, and render them not only useless, but highly injurious subjects, in the attempt to form a colony. (Endacott 1964c : 96-8, quoted in Smith 1985 Samuel Fearon, the Census and Registration Officer, worried much about internal law and order. He wrote in 1845,
The arrival of the British fleet in the harbour speedily attracted a considerable boat population, and the profits accruing from the supply of provisions and necessaries at once raised many from poverty and infamy to considerable wealth. The shelter and protection afforded by the presence of the fleet soon made our shores the resort of outlaws, opium smugglers, and indeed, of all persons who had rendered themselves obnoxious to the Chinese laws, and had the means of escaping hither. In course of time the demands for labour, for the public and other works drew some thousands to the island, the majority of whom were Hakkas or gypsies; people whose habits, character and language mark them as a distinct race. Careless of the ties of home and of those moral obligations, the observance of which is deemed absolutely necessary to the preservation of the national integrity, uneasy under the restraint of law and unscrupulous of the means by which they live, they abandon without hesitation their hearths and household gods, their birthright and their father's tombs, to wander, unrespected, whither gain may call them. The unsettled state of the Colony, and the vast amount of crime during its infancy afford abundant proof of the demoralizing effects of their presence. (CO 129/12, 24 June, 1845 , quoted in Smith 1985 Regardless of any bias or racial arrogance that characterizes these remarks, they seem to confirm what the Chinese authorities predicted in the Canton Register in 1841: that under British jurisdiction, the island would become even more popular with social outcasts; that "Hong Kong will be the resort and rendezvous of all the Chinese smugglers"; and that "Opium smoking shops and gamblinghouses will soon spread; to those haunts will flock all the discontented and bad spirits of the empire" (Canton Register 23 February, 1841; quoted in Smith 1985: 107). In fact, apart from the international trade in opium and coolies, open gambling houses and brothels were the only local businesses that the "new rich" of Hong Kong were likely to establish. 1 But the most important factor for this dearth of "respectable" Chinese leaders in Hong Kong concerns the fact that the majority of the Chinese population in Hong Kong then were male immigrants or sojourners attached to no local village. The British could not secure the cooperation of village elders simply because there were extremely few village elders in the colony. In fact, the immigrant population soon took over the native villages, thus rendering it difficult or useless for the colonial government to coopt the traditional local leaders.
The (Self-)Making of the Colonial Hong Kong Chinese Elite
Hong Kong lacked a well-defined local Chinese community that possessed strong local leadership; in this absence, the British idea of dual administration soon evolved into a constitutionally centralized, but operationally self-limiting, governance. The colonial government kept almost autocratic power in the hands of the governor; Chinese residents were subject to crude coercive measures such as nightly curfew, elaborate registration schemes, and other surveillance and policing practices. Tensions between the Europeans and the Chinese were quite pronounced, especially in the mid-1850s, when a series of incidents led to the Second Opium War (1856-1860). Ernst Johann Eitel, a missionary and secretary to the governor, wrote in the 1890s of an "unbridged chasm" between the Chinese and the Europeans (Eitel 1895). The effective segregation of the two communities from each other had a long-lasting impact on the colonial regime, one of which was its failure to devolve governmental power to the municipal level. For example, the central colonial government had to levy rates for police pay because any devolution of power on the part of local bodies would, according to conventional wisdom, easily trigger conflict between Europeans and Chinese. In this light, early colonial Hong Kong appears to have operated under an informal segregated rule rather than under conventional indirect rule.
However, the spatial separation of the two communities resulted from their mutually practiced segregation. The separation eventually created a new foundation for a more stable indirect rule, as a new type of collaborative relationship gradually took shape. Chinese war collaborators such as Tam Achoy and Loo Aqui rapidly amassed their wealth through opium trade and through the land granted by the British; a Chinese class of "new rich" gradually evolved, and its members were invariably interested in land and property speculation. Also, as the colonial government wanted to reserve the more valuable waterfront properties for the Europeans, the Chinese were encouraged to relocate in specified areas that were quite separate from the waterfront. The concentration of Chinese in the exclusive zone called "Chinatown" near Tai Ping Shan enabled local Chinese leadership to grow independent of British governmental processes (Evans 1970; Chan 1991) . Former war collaborators gradually became local leaders because they were wealthy enough to donate money to notable charity services; moreover, the close association of these individuals with powerful secret societies conferred on them significant political clout among the Chinese.
One of the landmark events delineating leadership status in the Chinese community -one that also transformed the "unrespectable" Chinese to "respectability" -was the building, in 1847, of the Man Mo Temple by Loo and Tam; the place later functioned not only as a religious site but also as a social center from which the Chinese exercised a certain informal self-government (Lethbridge 1978: ch. 4; Ting 1989) . Generally not regarded by the British as respectable persons, and regarded by the Qing government as traitors, the founders of the temple nevertheless formed the first generation of Hong Kong Chinese community leaders whose main political function was to mediate between the colonial government and the Chinese.
2 The temple also functioned as an unofficial link between the Hong Kong Chinese and the Canon authorities. As described by Eitel, Man Mo Temple "secretly controlled native affairs, acted as commercial arbitrators, arranged for the due reception of mandarins passing through the colony, [and] negotiated the sale of [Qing's] official titles" (Eitel 1895: 282).
In traditional rural China, the elite, or gentry, usually served as intermediaries between the local people and governmental authorities; the government recruited them from the ranks of scholars, who normally obtained degrees from the imperial examination system. A person who excelled in the examination would receive an appointment to a government office, and such an appointment translated into the opportunity to accumulate economic wealth. As a member of the gentry remained a member of his village, local leaders and governmental bodies usually maintained close connections with each other. However, Hong Kong farmers had produced few, if any, scholars or literati; Hong Kong Chinese fishermen did not have kin ties with the gentry. Therefore, the colonial administration could not simply build relationships with the ordinary Chinese on the basis of an old gentry class. However, the economic growth of the 1850s and the 1860s for the opium trade and the coolie trade created favorable conditions for the emergence of this small group of Chinese elite, which comprised contractors, merchants, compradors, government servants, and Christian employees of missionary groups (Smith 1985) . Mixing with the newly immigrated wealthy merchants from Canton, the gentry gradually transformed themselves into part of the new elite Chinese or, in John Carroll's description, the first local bourgeoisie (Carroll 2005) . Their emergence opened up the possibility that a new pattern of collaborative colonial relationships would take shape. After the mid-1860s, the legal system in Hong Kong functioned with fewer and less pronounced discriminatory measures among races; also, under the more "humanistic" governorship of Sir Richard Graves MacDonnell (1866-1872), a new partnership between the Chinese elite and the colonial authorities became possible. The landmark signifying the stabilization of indirect rule through these locally grown elite began with the establishment of Tung Wah Hospital. The new form of collaboration is nicely encapsulated in the title of Sinn's book on this institution: Power and Charity (Sinn 1989) .
Philanthropy as Collaborative Institution
Tung Wah Hospital was established in 1872; it was the core institution of the new form of collaborative colonialism. Its establishment was to address the Chinese needs for welfare and medical services. As many of the poor in early colonial Hong Kong were sojourners from mainland China, death on their journey to Hong Kong created a problem because traditional Chinese custom insisted on burial in one's place of origin. In 1851, the colonial government granted a piece of land to the Chinese for them to house the ancestral tablets of those deceased who did not have families in Hong Kong. The frequent abuse of this unregulated place by moribund Chinese prompted a subscription campaign that called for the establishment of a properly run Chinese hospital. The founding directors of the hospital were all prominent Chinese figures -mostly either compradors working for the European companies or merchants from guilds such as the Nam Pak Hong (Nam Pak Hong 1979). Some other directors were self-appointed Kaifong (street committee) leaders whom one analyst described as a group of "civic-minded, status-seeking and paternalistic citizens" (Lethbridge 1978). However, though set up initially as a philanthropic enterprise, the hospital's functions were never purely medical. It dispensed Chinese justice as well as Chinese medicine, and was encouraged by the government to give advice on various government policies. As the institution developed, it also started to settle minor civic disputes, manage temples, and build schools; occasionally, it petitioned the government, calling for the redress of grievances. The colonial government, happy to see the directorate act in ways that helped manage the Chinese, even allowed the Registrar-General, who had been trained in the cadet service and equipped with a good knowledge of the Chinese language, to participate in their work -in short, the colonial government gave the hospital a quasi-official standing.
3
The hospital was indeed a bizarre and slightly odd version of the structure of gentry rule, the existence of which, in Hong Kong, was rather rudimentary at the time of the arrival of the British. Yet, it followed the previous exemplary hybrid organization, the District Watch Committee (founded in 1867) in mixing Chinese and British traditions. During Governor John Pope Hennessy's rule (1877-1883), the influence and the authority of the hospital reached new heights: the directorate of the hospital began to act as though it had inherited the magisterial function of the traditional petty Mandarins. Moreover, the hospital's unconstitutional status enabled the hospital to assert itself, culturally and politically, far beyond what the British had anticipated. Lethbridge records that "at the formal opening of the Hospital in 1872, the full committee, some 70 or 80 in number, were all dressed in the Mandarin costume, some even with peacock's feathers attached to their buttons" (Lethbridge 1978: 61) . Similarly, in 1878, during a visit by the governor, 300 influential native residents from all classes of the community were present, and some 50 or 60 of them were in Mandarin costumes, some of which sported blue buttons, some crystal, and some gold, while a few had the additional honor of wearing the peacock's feather (Lethbridge 1978: 61) . In the Qing dynasty, buttons and feathers on Mandarin costumes signified a detailed official ranking. It was difficult to tell whether those people wearing Mandarin costumes had acquired these signifiers in a regular way or an irregular way, or whether they wore them as sheer masquerade. 4 Yet, the costumes were effective in signaling both to the colonial authority and to the local inhabitants that the wearers were somehow endowed with an effective magisterial power within the Chinese community. Rather than display an alien colonial rule imposed on the Chinese, the presence of a British governor in such ceremonies only reinforced the perception of the continuity of sheer imperial power, whether British or Qing. Though authorized by no one to do so, the new Hong Kong Chinese elite was eager to play this role. Such highly ritualistic practices demonstrate that the hospital's directorate, and thus the rising Hong Kong Chinese elite, were keen on imagining themselves to have gained social advancement in very Chinese terms under British colonial rule.
If the role of self-imagined gentry that this new elite played under the British legislation was merely symbolic and ritualistic, such gesture, however, facilitated their real attainment of status in China. In real terms, the directorate interested itself not only in the general welfare of the Chinese population within Hong Kong, but also in the neighboring Chinese provinces. The hospital's active participation in activities that organized Hong Kong and overseas Chinese and that, for example, raised money for flood relief in China gradually earned the hospital some formal recognition from the Chinese emperor. Such activities also gave the hospital further access to formal bodies of power within the Chinese government. Zhang Zidong, the famous reformist official, at one stage made use of Tung Wah's connections in order to reach, and to collect information from, the increasingly influential overseas Chinese communities. He sent instructions to the hospital in Hong Kong as if to a part of a Chinese administrative department (Sinn 1989: 137-149) .
In the late 1890s, all this ostentatious display of political clout seemed to be sidestepping British sovereignty in Hong Kong, creating enmity on the part of the European community. This enmity erupted as a serious scandal, in which some Europeans accused the hospital of being a secret society and of subverting the colonial government, so the governor conducted a formal investigation to mollify the critics of the Chinese elite. Although the fairness of the investigation was in doubt, Tung Wah's directorate was vindicated. And although the Hong Kong government retreated a bit in their recognition of Tung Wah's special status after this event, the directorate continued to assume the role of Hong Kong's gentry class (Sinn 1989: 150-156) .
A person's self-assumption of, and re-enactment of, the role of gentry, was significant in the Hong Kong context, as it simultaneously resurrected and turned around the cultural and political configuration of traditional Chinese local rule. Rather than gain their gentry status through exhibited excellence in Chinese classics, as was typical in the imperial examinations, this elite stratum manifested its ability to gain access to an imperial power representing not the Qing Emperor but the British Crown. British colonial officials, especially those who were concerned with Chinese affairs, were content to see a body that could help attend to "Chinese" matters in "Chinese" ways. Although Governor Arthur Edward Kennedy (1872-1877) turned down the aggressive hospital directorate's proposal for a Chinese Municipal Board that would function as a separate governing structure for Chinese, the hospital still attained an important status in advising the government concerning anything Chinese, and posed as the single Chinese voice under British colonial rule (Eitel 1895: 507) .
The hospital directorate's assumption of such a role as surrogate gentry reflected ingrained cultural aspirations as much as political calculations. Chinese officials had assigned the label traitor to many subsequently successful businessmen, either because they had left China at a time when the imperial government prohibited emigration or because they had helped the British in successive foreign intrusions. Now, however, these businessmen played the role of the gentry class and obtained recognition from both of the imperial powers. To compensate for their lack of cultural leadership (a lack that was evident in their unfamiliarity with traditionally praised excellence in Chinese classics), members of the new gentry class set themselves regular ritual observances identical to those of the literati-magistrates in imperial China: members of the new gentry attended the Man Mo Temple to participate in the spring and autumn sacrifices to Confucius. They also set up Confucius learning societies, built schools to teach Confucius' teachings, and boasted that Confucian teaching gave them Chinese identity (Lethbridge 1978: ch. 3; Sinn 1989) .
Fondness for Confucianism and a more general inclination toward traditionalism were phenomena particularly prominent in the late-nineteenthcentury overseas Chinese community. Parallel cases could indeed be found in Southeast Asian colonies such as Penang and Singapore. This overseas Chinese traditionalism later found itself at odds with the more iconoclastic and revolutionary mood throughout mainland China at the turn of the century. However, in the 1870s, traditionalism, for this Hong Kong Chinese elite, was still significant in real terms: defense of the interests of the elite within a patriarchal system whose location was more and more influenced by Western ideas. This state of affairs leads us to the story of the Po Leung Kuk, a sister institution of Tung Wah Hospital.
Patriarchy in Collaborative Colonialism
When, in the New World, the widespread abolition of slavery came to fruition in the late nineteenth century, the demand for cheap labor there skyrocketed. This demand, in turn, spurred great demand for cheap labor from China. There were only a few merchants in Hong Kong who did not have a hand in this profitable coolie trade. As mentioned before, the selling indentured labor was a core business that triggered early colonial Hong Kong's economic development. The lucrative nature of the business, however, provoked abusive practices, such as kidnapping and the use of false premises to lure emigrants; it was reported that massive irregular forced emigration occurred all over the coastal regions of China. International pressures mounted to stop forced emigration, but the Qing government remained ineffective in regulating the emigration (Irick 1982; Yen 1985; Tsai 1993: ch. 4) . Britain was also compelled to restrict the coolie trade among its colonies in order to stamp out kidnapping and other criminal practices therein. The Hong Kong Chinese elite were eager to exhibit their good intentions by helping the colonial government root out the illegal sale of human beings. Volunteering to expose cases of abuse in the emigration trade, the elite not only presented themselves as cooperative but took the initiative in such affairs, as well. Tung Wah Hospital soon shouldered the related responsibilities by employing two detectives who would report and stop crimes related to emigration; the hospital also the coordinated efforts, however limited in real terms, made by both the British government and the Chinese government.
As concerns about human rights gradually rose, international pressure was mounting and calls to prohibit servitude eventually came to include the sale of girls for prostitution. The inclusion of this particular trade in prohibited forms of servitude posed a significant threat to the Chinese patriarchal practice of buying girls from poor families and bringing them up as domestic servants: that is, the mui tsai system (Haslewood 1930). Hong Kong's Chinese elite (most of whom were also Tung Wah directors) proposed the establishment of the Po Leung Kuk (Hong Kong Society for the Protection of Women and Children) to protect these victims from the rampant, abusive emigration trade. The elite asked for the authority to employ detectives, offer rewards for arrests, and return victims to their homes. However, with the exception of its protection services, including the very controversial practice of "marrying off" their clients, the Po Leung Kuk constituted an influential lobby that sought to ameliorate the impact of the new "sale-of-girls" ordinance. The society organized a series of London-bound petitions that opposed the ban on the mui tsai system (Smith 1981; Sinn 1989: 113-117) . In short, the society defended Chinese custom, invoked Captain Elliot's proclamation concerning segregated rule, and advocated legal exemptions for the wealthy who chose to practice mui tsai. The society put forward the argument of "cultural preservation," interpreting mui tsai as a normal "social custom" that was far from being abusive. Refusing to admit that mui tsai is a form of child slavery, the society wanted only to distinguish legal sales from illegal sales. With their strong influence on some government officials and their well-entrenched positions in Hong Kong's power formation, the Po Leung Kuk held out against the strong pressure of anti-mui tsai campaigners from Britain and Hong Kong societies for decades (Smith 1981 (Smith , 1995 . It was only after many long and hard struggles, which brought pressures to bear from the Colonial Office, the League of Nations, Christian societies, missionaries on the ground, unionists, and women activists, that the abolition of the mui tsai system came to pass in the 1920s.
The mui tsai struggles demonstrate very well the rather reactionary face of indirect rule in Hong Kong, insofar as social reforms and the incessant quest for progress were growing rapidly in China around the turn of the century. Nevertheless, the conservatism of the colonial Chinese elite obtained protection under the colonial system, even though campaigners' efforts kept coming from both the local society and the colonial home country. The complicity between the Chinese and the British elements in the early collaborative colonial regime would not have been possible without the help of certain individual governors such as Kennedy and Hennessy, who favored the Chinese elite in exchange for their support in matters such as fund-raising projects related or unrelated to Hong Kong welfare. For example, Hennessy, an Irishman, was on very good terms with Hong Kong's Chinese businessmen, for they were particularly more generous in contributing to the Irish Relief Fund than were Hong Kong's Europeans (Sinn 1989: 119) . This close collaboration between the Chinese elite and the localized British colonial officials in Hong Kong dominated both the form of political power on the island and the ways to interpret Chinese cultural values. The collaboration was a form of political power in which actors could exploit charity work and charity institutions as a scaffold for the actors' exercise of social power in the name of cultural differences.
Man Mo Temple signified the unruly period of early segregated rule; however, quasi-official charity institutions such as the Po Leung Kuk and Tung Wah Hospital were characteristic of the collaborative colonialism that took root in colonial Hong Kong. These institutions, although eclipsed by colonialist proactive interventions of the twentieth century, laid down the basic parameters according to which collaboration between the British colonizers and the Chinese elite functioned. Shuttling along the frontier between two empires, the Hong Kong Chinese elite affirmed for themselves a distinct identity by securing a social and political status that had been unimaginable under past Chinese rule and by consolidating a bi-culturalism based upon reified notions of both Western and Chinese cultures. Carroll observes that the remarkable growth of the elite translated into the gradual emergence of a full-fledged bourgeoisie of Hong Kong (Carroll 2005, ch. 4).
However, I would like to qualify Carroll's observation. There is little evidence that a Chinese bourgeoisie, possessing its own class consciousness, characterized Hong Kong's social landscape at that time. The Hong Kong Chinese elite, in the late nineteenth century, chose to play the role of a surrogate gentry that mimicked the roles played by their counterparts in mainland China. David Faure (2003) also cautions against the substitution of the word elite for the word gentry as they carry overlapping but still distinct connotations respectively in British cultural contexts and in traditional Chinese cultural contexts. To Faure, if a gentry shares in its locality's Chinese dynastic governmental power, then the gentry legitimated dynastic rule. In the case of Hong Kong, the relatively complex composition of the island's elite made any such legitimation problematic, if indeed the legitimation was not merely an effect created by scholars who conflated the western conception of elite with the Chinese conception of gentry. I would also maintain that the imaginary resurrection of traditional social roles by Hong Kong's Chinese elite, reveals a lot about the political culture and the legacies of this hybrid class in power. On the one hand, they rose to prominence because of their wealth; on the other hand, they sought official recognition from the colonizer, as mainland Chinese gentry did from the emperor. Such a reenactment of the traditional gentry role could not have been possible without a particular colonial situation in which the colonizer, to facilitate its governance of the colonized, had to allow for the collaborative Chinese "re-invention of tradition". The cultural implications of the Chinese re-invention of patriarchal institutions in the name of philanthropy are profound because Hong Kong, by consolidating the surrogate-gentry's power to preserve cultural conservatism, divorced itself from the iconoclastic and progressive challenges of the modern Chinese nationalism represented by the May Fourth Movement (1919) in China.
The legacies of this collaborative colonial formation in Hong Kong can still be found in much later eras, not only in the city's conspicuous lack of a politically progressive bourgeoisie but also in its weak civil society. There is no class project of the bourgeoisie leading the society in the course of social reforms. The elite is, instead, easily prone to collaboration or even to collusion with whatever government is in power. They behave as if they are always in need of seeking recognition from the previous imperial authority or colonial master. At any rate, Hong Kong's powerful class of Chinese has never developed a political project that would lead to autonomy for that same class; in other words, the Hong Kong Chinese elite do not build their social power in civil society, an arena separate from or even in opposition to the ruling government. What contemporary Hong Kong has inherited from its colonial past may be Chinese tycoons rich in wealth; but they are not a strong bourgeoisie. They carry with them the lingering patriarchic values, associated conservative ways of life and the tradition of making collusive relations between governmental power and "civil society" organizations. Because, in Hong Kong's long colonial past, practices of collaboration always pre-conditioned the growth of Hong Kong's bourgeoisie as much as for the civil institutions that usually embody the pervasiveness of colonial power. Therefore, what is at stake for the Hong Kong Chinese elite's legacy of collaborative practices is not so much the close partnership between the Chinese ruling elite and the European ruling elite as the quasi-governmental nature of most civil institutions in Hong Kong.
Collaboration is a key that can take us to look beyond a spurious dichotomy between the colonizer and the colonized and to recognize in early colonial Hong Kong the agential power of the Chinese gentry-elite, but it would be a glaring error not to consider how they bore the colonial imprints. For it is in this early phase that we see how the development of an autonomous bourgeoisie, like it happened in Europe, was both facilitated and thwarted in Hong Kong because Hong Kong's development of collaborative power was premised precisely on a colonial milieu. To get to the collaborative as well as to the colonial nature of the power formation, I would argue, is the key approach by which we can understand Hong Kong's political culture then and now.
